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Abstract  
  
Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue 
that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by 
empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can 
be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s 
moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of 
relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. 
Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative 
relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline 
naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical 
constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that 
are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for 
moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest 
how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral 
relativism in the future.  
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1 Moral Relativism and its opposites 
 
The goal of this paper is to integrate recent naturalist philosophical and moral 
psychological work on moral relativism. Philosophers draw distinctions between cultural 
and individual relativism, and between extreme and moderate moral relativism, and ask 
what moral prescriptions are in accordance with human psychology. However, moral 
psychologists generally do not employ these distinctions, making it difficult to examine 
the extent to which their research findings can or cannot be compared to various 
philosophical positions. We aim to bridge this disciplinary divide and integrate this 
conceptual landscape in contemporary and future research. Where appropriate, we will 
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make explicit and defend our philosophical commitments, and clarify the concepts we 
use. We start by introducing a working definition of moral relativism.  
 
The term ‘moral relativism’ is associated with a variety of very different concepts, some 
of which function mainly to oppose the view. Schematically, we intend to use the term as 
follows: Moral relativism consists of three components. First, it holds that descriptive, 
prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ 
‘ought,’ etc. (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral view. Second, 
moral relativism holds that there is variation in these moral views, and, third, this 
variation cannot be entirely eliminated, either practically or by following certain 
epistemological rules.  
 
This is quite abstract; in order to clarify this we will first give a stylized example of moral 
relativism and then contrast moral relativism with other ethical views that are sometimes 
used as its opposite. Since we are interested in the empirical constraints of normative, or 
prescriptive moral relativism, we give a normative example. Assume that Claudia, a pro-
choice activist, says abortion is permissible and is having an abortion; meanwhile Susan, 
a pro-life activist, says abortion is wrong and she continues her pregnancy. A normative 
relativist may hold that Claudia is permitted to have an abortion because it is in 
accordance with her values while at the same time it would be wrong for Susan to have 
an abortion because abortion is not in accordance with Susan’s values; the moral 
relativist may also hold that his own moral standards are not important in judging Claudia 
or Susan. The normative relativist can, moreover, hold that pro-life and pro-choice values 
are both equally legitimate.  
 
As to normative relativism’s opposites, we turn to the three components that we outlined. 
The first component relates legitimacy to moral views, meaning that what is right or 
wrong depends at least partially on a subject’s or culture’s moral views and not entirely 
on anything that exists independent of people’s minds. This makes moral relativism 
markedly different than moral objectivism, the latter here holding that what is right or 
wrong is substantially mind-independent. With this meaning of moral objectivism we 
stay very close to its use by scholars whose work we will discuss later in Sections 3 and 4 
(e.g., Ruse 1986; Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003; Goodwin and Darley 2008). The 
second aspect in our scheme concerns scope, where relativism is distinct from 
universalism. Moral universalism holds that acts are right or wrong for everyone. 
Universalism does not entail any metaphysical claim: objectivism and universalism may 
be orthogonal concepts, though objectivism usually entails universalism. These concepts 
will be of interest in Section 4, when we evaluate normative theories’ empirical 
assumptions. But first we turn to distinctions and theories within normative relativism. 
2 Distinctions and theories within normative relativism 
 
First, an important initial distinction is between extreme and moderate relativism (Moser 
and Carson 2001; cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009). Extreme normative relativism holds that 
all moral actions are relatively right or wrong, or that every action can be required or 
ought to be tolerated or respected. Those who criticize moral relativism often equate 
  
relativism with extreme normative relativism. According to Levy (2002: 25), for 
example, its opponents fear that “If relativism is true, then there are no absolute moral 
standards in the name of which we can denounce the Nazi holocaust, the slave trade or 
the Spanish Inquisition…If relativism is true, then anything goes.” According to Brandt 
(1967/2001:28), the following extremely relativistic view is popular: “if someone thinks 
it is right (wrong) to do A, then it is right (wrong) for him to do A,” a view that amounts 
to subjectivism. However, contemporary moral philosophers hardly ever defend extreme 
normative relativism.1 Instead, their view is best described as moderate normative 
relativism, which holds that some but not all moral actions are relatively right or wrong, 
and other moral actions are universally right or wrong. Wong (1984; 2006) and Levy 
(2002), for example, hold that we can find many different existing moral views, but only 
a subset of these are legitimate.  
 
Second, there is a continuum with cultural relativism at one end and individual relativism 
at the other end. Individual relativism holds that an action is right or wrong depending on 
the moral view of the individual. In contrast, cultural relativists hold that whether an 
action is right or wrong depends on the moral viewpoint of the individual’s culture. In 
works on moral relativism, the distinction between individuals and their cultural context 
is often implicit (e.g.Beebe, 2010). 
 
A common prescriptive view discussed under the rubric of moral relativism is tolerance. 
A prescription to tolerate means that you should not interfere with actions that you (or 
your culture) consider wrong. Again, moderate tolerance means that not all actions ought 
to be tolerated; only a subset of the actions one deems wrong ought to be tolerated (Wong 
2006). Often tolerance is only required of moral relativists. The idea of tolerance is 
criticized for being psychologically impossible (Section 3); accordingly, some empirical 
studies touch upon the topic of tolerance (Section 4). 
 
Irrespective of empirical findings, Wong (2006) rejects tolerance. Instead, he 
recommends that if one considers an act to be wrong, one should accommodate, meaning 
that one should attempt to understand the other’s viewpoint. For example, stated 
simplistically, the Western world prioritizes autonomy over community, while the 
Eastern world prioritizes community over autonomy. Individuals from both types of 
cultures can nevertheless understand that autonomy and community are valuable. When 
confronted with another morality, one thus has to put oneself in the other’s shoes. 
Wong’s theory is relativistic because it centralizes the notion of ambivalence. 
Ambivalence happens when one comes to understand the other’s point of view, and 
thereafter holds two values in mind. These values thus prescribe irreconcilable actions for 
one and the same actor. If community-values dictate that one must take care for one’s 
family, while autonomy-values dictate that one must pursue one’s own interests, one 
experiences ambivalence. This experience is similar to that of a moral dilemma : “even if 
we are firm in taking a side, we can understand that something of moral value is lost 
when we act on that side, and the loss is of such a nature that we cannot simply dismiss it 
as a regrettable though justifiable result of the right decision” (Wong 2006: 21).  
                                                 
1
 This is different for meta-ethical relativism: meta-ethical relativism is most often presented or defended in 
its extreme form, namely that all moral statements are relatively right or wrong if meta-ethical relativism is 
correct. For a discussion of this view, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009. 
 
  
 
Wong’s view resembles notions of respect. For Levy (2002: 62-66), respect demands that 
one tries to understand the value of certain other ways of life in order to either affirm 
them as worthwhile or reject them as illegitimate. For Heyd (1996), respect is the value 
of understanding individuals in order to evaluate them independently of their acts. 
Respect here entails that one does not immediately judge the person because of his or her 
actions. 
3 The relevance of empirical data for philosophical 
theories  
 
When arguing for or against the theories sketched above, naturalist philosophers 
introduce both normative and empirical assumptions. Below we outline their major 
arguments with the aim of evaluating their empirical assumptions in Section 4. 
3.1 Arguments for normative relativism  
 
A popular line of argument in defense of normative relativism, procedural argument, 
depends on the existence of fundamental disagreement. This is disagreement that cannot 
be resolved by a specified procedure. An example of such a procedure is given by Brandt 
when he says that, to assert that moral disagreements are non-fundamental is to presume 
that “all ethical diversity2 can be removed, in principle, by the advance of science, 
leading to agreement about the properties of the things being appraised,” (1967/2001: 25-
26). If moral disagreement cannot be removed by the advance of science, then Brandt 
speaks about fundamental moral disagreement. Other such procedures have been 
proposed (Levy 2002: 77; Wong 1984: chapter 12; Wong 2006; Doris and Plakias 2008). 
In general, a procedural argument holds that when one cannot convince others with 
‘reasonable’ arguments, this is, arguments that comply with the accepted epistemology, 
one has no right to impose one’s view on others. We can clarify this reasoning with the 
following example: A pro-life activist might want to convince a hearer that abortion is 
wrong. However, both might think that only rational arguments are acceptable. If the 
activist has exhausted all her rational arguments without convincing her conversational 
partner, then she is not justified in prohibiting or interfering with the hearer’s abortion, 
even though she is certain that abortion is wrong.  Granted, the activist might consider 
attempting to influence the other with more manipulative techniques, such as repulsive 
and saddening images of dead fetuses. While affective reactions might induce one to 
disapprove of abortion, such images, and the affects they induce, do not constitute 
rational arguments. The pro-life activist is therefore not warranted to use these 
arguments, or to interfere with abortion.  
 
Other naturalist arguments in defense of normative relativism follow the same strategy of 
starting from empirical assumptions about moral diversity and introducing normative 
                                                 
2
 Ethical diversity is here the same as moral diversity. All moral disagreement is an instance of moral 
diversity but not all moral diversity is an instance of moral disagreement.  
  
assumptions. However, since we will mainly evaluate empirical arguments against 
specific theories of normative relativism, we will now discuss the latter. 
3.2 Arguments against normative relativism  
 
Other philosophers have objected that we cannot impose relativist norms on people 
because it would not fit with our species’ moral psychology. First of all, in order to 
tolerate other points of view, one has to be capable of entertaining the idea that different 
requirements hold for different people. A first critique argues that this way of thinking 
about morality is not possible. This is the problem of feasibility. Ruse (1986) argues that 
we evolved to think of morality as objectively true in the service of motivating us to act 
upon our values. As a consequence, people are innately objectivist about morality. 
Another consequence is that, should one manage to think of a judgment as relative, then 
one necessarily would no longer think of it as a moral judgment. This leads us to ask if 
people are indeed inclined to be moral objectivists. We will examine empirical results 
that speak to the question of the feasibility of normative relativism in Section 4.  
 
Flanagan (1991), who is equally committed to a notion of feasibility (Flanagan 1991: 32), 
stresses that we have to make a distinction between the realizability of relativism for 
everyone and its realizability for particular individuals (Flanagan 1991: 48). In this view, 
it might be psychologically plausible to impose a relativist morality on some people but 
not on everyone. Interpreted like this, the problem of feasibility simply leads us to ask 
whether at least some people are moral relativists. In Section 4 we will therefore examine 
empirical findings on individual differences in moral relativism.  
 
Wong (2006) presents a still more nuanced take on psychological realism. He claims that 
we should not ask whether something is feasible; instead, for epistemological reasons, the 
criterion should be that it is not impossible. Even more, moralities that wrongly reject 
possible requirements should be ruled out as legitimate moralities: “Interestingly, 
however, seeing that certain possibilities are real enough (if not realistic) also works as a 
constraint on adequate moralities. Those moralities that in some way depend for their 
acceptance on denying the reality of certain possibilities must also be ruled out as 
inadequate,” (Wong 2006: 176). This more nuanced interpretation of the problem of 
feasibility leads us to ask if we can reasonably say that it is impossible for human beings 
to think of morality as relative, no matter what the developmental conditions. Again, 
empirical research bears on this question (Section 4). 
 
A second critique holds that, if we do think of morality as relative, then we will come to 
rely less upon moral values. This is the problem of confidence. Moral relativism would 
lead us to weaken our adherence to moral principles, thereby being less motivated to act 
or judge in accordance with them. This problem of confidence is foregrounded by Ruse 
(1986) when he says that “we think [morality is] binding upon us because we think it has 
an objective status,” (his emphasis). As we will see in Section 4, studies have compared 
the (reported) moral behavior of relativists and non-relativists. 
 
  
A third criticism specifically holds for tolerance. Judging an act to be wrong allegedly 
implies that we are motivated to stop the action. An appeal to tolerate what we condemn 
is unstable because it goes against the drive to interfere with what we condemn. This is 
the paradox of toleration. Fletcher (1996) gives a clear account of the paradox of 
toleration: “tolerance presupposes a complexity of two sentiments: the first, an impulse to 
intervene and regulate the lives of others, and the second, an imperative - either logical or 
moral - to restrain that impulse,” (Fletcher 1996:158). For this reason, tolerance will 
never hold for long.  
 
Wong (2006) equally rejects tolerance; he therefore suggests that ambivalence and the 
process of accommodation will introduce new values and open up new morally 
permissible possibilities – without devaluing our previous commitments or urging us to 
intervene in previously condemned behavior. Levy’s (2002) and Heyd’s (1996) notions 
of respect are inspired by the same rejection of tolerance. However, criticisms of 
tolerance beg the question of whether disapproving an act is in fact psychologically 
linked to an irresistible impulse to intervene . This is, after all, an empirical question. 
4 Empirical studies on moral relativism 
 
4.1 Feasability 
 
4.1.1 Defining moral relativism away 
 
Are individuals inclined to think of morality as non-relative, as Ruse (1986) proclaimed? 
At first sight research into the development of morality indeed hints that our moral 
psychology is at odds with relativism. Piaget argues that, by the age of seven, children are 
moral realists, meaning that they regard values as independent of the mind and imposing 
themselves, regardless of the circumstances (Piaget 1932: 106).  However, after the age 
of ten, rules in general are conceptualized as autonomous, being thought of as man-made 
and as legitimated by consensus or conformity. Different rules can be fair if everybody 
agrees with them or follows them (Piaget 1932: 57). Hence, in this view, children start off 
as moral non-relativists but develop in the direction of relativity (Piaget 1932: 316). 
However, Kohlberg added four more stages after the two moral stages proposed by 
Piaget. In Kohlberg’s scheme, the final stage of moral development is characterized by 
the form of norms: moral rules are right whenever they are universalizable. Stages three 
to five are characterized by the content of general moral principles - interpersonal 
relations, social order, and rights, respectively. Accordingly, individuals who have 
reached stages three to five think that all moral rules are guided by those specific 
universal principles, while individuals who have reached stage six hold that moral rules 
are right whenever they are universalizable.  
 
A closer look at this research adds nuance to the above conclusions. Kohlberg’s 
conception of morality was biased towards non-relativism: he defined the moral domain 
by referring to Kant’s formal principle of universalizability. This necessarily limits the 
  
scope of empirical investigation. If the researcher does not conceptualize a certain rule as 
universalizable, it will not be studied as a moral rule, even if subjects would categorize 
the rule as moral, if asked. Granted, one needs a prior conception of morality in order to 
know what to investigate. However, this conception could be minimal and broader at the 
start, allowing the data to guide the investigation by, for example, asking participants if 
the rule has anything to do with morality as they conceptualize it. Kohlberg-inspired 
methods are biased towards finding people to be moral non-relativists. For example, 
consider instruments such as Rest’s Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979). It is not surprising 
that moral reasoning scores, and hence moral universalism, increase with age (Rest 1983) 
and college attendance (Rest 1988), given that only universalist thinking is seen as moral 
thinking by the investigators.  
 
The above problem shows up to an even larger extent in domain theory and, more 
specifically, research concerning the postulated moral-conventional distinction. Theorists 
in this tradition (e.g., Turiel 1983; Turiel et al. 1987; Smetana 2006; Schweder 1990) 
hold that people make a distinction between ‘morality’ and ‘convention.’ In early work, 
Turiel (1983: 35) provides working definitions for ‘the moral domain’ and ‘the 
conventional domain.’ He describes conventions as relative to the societal context: 
conventions are rules that vary from one social system to another or when general usage 
or consensus differs, and they are justified by referring to convention, habit, or 
behavioral uniformities. For example, a conventional rule has to be followed when and 
because everybody does it. Turiel (1983: 39) further describes moral rules as universal 
and justified by referring to concepts of harm, justice and rights. As a consequence, 
moral rules cannot vary as long as the moral properties of the situation are the same.  
 
Turiel and followers have since employed a specific method (the moral/conventional 
task) to determine if individuals indeed distinguish conventional from moral rules on the 
basis of their variability and justification. The dimension of justification is assessed by 
asking subjects why a specific transgression is wrong, while the dimension of variability 
is assessed by asking if the act would also be wrong in a different social system, or when 
general usage differs. Either of these criteria can determine that the transgression is non-
relatively wrong. If a transgression is claimed to be wrong because of consensus, but is 
claimed to be wrong even when varying a range of societal factors, we cannot decide it is 
relative – it might be universally wrong. If a transgression is deemed wrong because it 
causes harm but it is deemed not wrong in a different society B, it might be the case that 
following the rule in society B would have morally reprehensible consequences and that 
the rule is in fact based on universal principles of, for example, justice. A rule can only be 
relatively right or wrong if it’s wrongness varies from one society to another and if the 
rule is justified by referring to local moral views, not by referring to universal moral 
principles. Hence, under this paradigm, it will be much easier to determine that 
participants perceive a rule to be non-relative than to determine that participants perceive 
a rule to be relative.  
 
Consonant with the aforementioned asymmetry in the affordances of the Turiel paradigm, 
an impressive corpus of empirical investigations employing this conceptual framework 
supports the conclusion that people are moral non-relativists (e.g., Wainryb et al. 2004; 
  
Turiel et al. 1987). Indeed, studies find that transgressions that are intuitively judged to 
be in the moral domain are consistently categorized as generalizably wrong and as wrong 
due to issues of harm, justice, and rights (e.g., Nucci and Turiel 1993). Despite this 
voluminous evidence, however, we argue that the methods used in these studies will fail 
to detect moral relativism when it occurs.  
 
Like Kohlberg, Turiel (1983) premises his approach on a narrow conception of ‘morality’ 
and ‘conventionality,’ drawing on a selection of philosophical theories that support 
universal accounts of morality (e.g., Searle 1969). Morality is defined as “analytically 
independent of systems of social organization that coordinate interactions,” (Turiel 1983: 
39). Moral right and wrong are determined by, and justified by, universal values of 
justice, rights, and ‘do no harm.’ As a consequence, what is morally wrong is morally 
wrong everywhere and its wrongness is justified by these universal values – wrongness is 
not determined by consensus. This is not a description, as moral systems do vary – it is a 
definition about the proper moral domain. In this conception, by definition, relativistic 
rules cannot be moral rules. For example, socio-functional accounts of morality as a 
device to regulate cooperation (e.g. Wong 2006) are excluded from the scope of research.  
 
In the moral/conventional task, participants are confronted with transgressions that have 
been selected and categorized by the researchers. In early studies (e.g. Nucci and Turiel 
1978; Turiel et al. 1987: 172-174; Nucci and Nucci 1982), researchers or independent 
jurors classified the transgressions based on the prior definitions of ‘moral’ and 
‘conventional.’ Some later studies (e.g. Nichols 2004; Nucci and Turiel 1993) adapt 
previously used scenarios. This opens the possibility that participants had to rate a biased 
sample of transgressions. There might be transgressions that many of us would intuitively 
classify as ‘moral’ but that are not generalizable or not dependent on issues of harm, 
justice or rights according to the researchers. Such transgressions would not have been 
included in these studies because they could not have been classified as either ‘moral’ or 
‘conventional’ due to their ‘atypical’ combination of characteristics. Hence, the finding 
that participants rated all ‘moral’ transgressions as generalizable means nothing more 
than that the participants agreed with the researchers regarding the generalizability of the 
selected transgressions. In addition, participants have typically been asked to rate a small 
number of transgressions. This opens the possibility that their answers were specific to 
the transgression considered and not to morality per se (Wright et al. 2008). Studies that 
included a wider range of scenarios and did not have inclusion or characterization criteria 
based on Turiel’s (1983) classification did not find this clear-cut conceptual distinction 
(e.g. Huebner et al. 2010; Nichols 2004; Kelly et al. 2007). Finally, there are cultural 
differences in how people classify transgressions. When participants belong to the same 
cultural group as do the researchers, we can expect that their response patterns will reflect 
the same intuitions as those of the researchers. Clear cultural differences have been found 
in the response patterns in regard to putative moral or conventional transgressions (e.g., 
Miller et al. 1990). Clearly, most studies do not ask participants whether they think of the 
transgression as moral or conventional - the distinction is made by the researchers, and its 
affirmation by participants is entirely implicit, dependent on their answers to questions 
intended to tap into the relevant properties. Wright et al. (2008) presented participants 
with a broad range of issues and asked them to explicitly classify them as moral or 
  
conventional. They found that, for almost all issues, there was no consensus among 
participants. Many issues were considered moral by one participant and conventional by 
another participant; some of these issues would have been classified as moral according 
to Turiel’s (1983) criteria, while other issues would have been classified as conventional. 
Huebner et al. (2010) employed principal components analysis to explore how 
participants’ judgments regarding a wide variety of putative moral and conventional 
transgressions assort. While arguing that postulated moral transgressions do cluster 
together, they also report that postulated conventional transgressions seem to form a 
continuum from conventional at one end to moralized at the other end. Findings such as 
these indicate that there are reasons to doubt the a priori rationale given for drawing the 
moral/conventional distinction where many researchers place it (see also Bauman and 
Skitka 2009). We suggest that, unless one knows the participants’ categorization, there is 
no reason to categorize particular transgressions one way or another (indeed, there might 
not even be a strict conceptual distinction at all, but instead a continuum, with moral and 
conventional as poles).  
 
This has important implications for the empirical question of whether or not people are 
moral relativists. Testing a limited range of moral issues is only informative if one 
expects that some individuals will be extreme relativists. Suppose it were the case that 
people were moderate moral relativists, deeming as ‘moral’ some transgressions that 
researchers in the Turiel tradition did not include or would have classified as 
‘conventional.’ If participants are not asked how they classify such transgressions, and if 
participants are presented with only a small set of transgressions that have been pre-
selected by researchers on the basis of the intuition that (in the researcher’s opinion) each 
is clearly moral or conventional, then even copious research will not reveal people’s 
relativist leanings. 
 
Ethical Ideologies 
 
A more open-minded body of research relevant to the present discussion is that 
employing the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) developed by Forsyth (1980). 
Forsyth proposes that people differ in their personal ‘ethical ideologies’: people differ in 
the degree they are relativists and idealists, two orthogonal continua ranging from low to 
high. Forsyth describes highly relativistic individuals as those that “feel that moral 
actions depend upon the nature of the situation and the individuals involved, and when 
judging others they weigh the circumstances more than the ethical principle that was 
violated,” (Forsyth 1992). At first glance, this definition might seem to differ 
substantially from our previous definition of relativism. Nonetheless, consider the 
components of the EPQ designed to categorize people along this dimension. Participants 
employ a 9-point Likert scale to indicate how much they agree with each of ten items. In 
Table 1, we reproduce these ten items, noting in the right column the extent to which 
each item bears on relativism as we have defined it. Items differ in the extent to which 
they tap whether people think of moral principles as variable, and whether moral 
disagreements can be resolved.  
 
  
Table 1: Items 11-20 of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (left) and how they relate to our proposed 
definition of moral relativism (right), from Forsyth 1980. 
 Item Morality is  … 
11 There are no ethical principles that are so important that 
they should be a part of any code of ethics. 
Variable, relative to a 
code of ethics 
12 What is ethical varies from one situation and society to 
another.  
Variable, relative to 
situation and society  
13 Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; 
what one person considers to be moral may be judged to be 
immoral by another person. 
Variable, relative to 
individual  
14  Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to 
"rightness." 
Variable  
and irresolvable 
15 Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be 
resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the 
individual. 
Relative to individual, 
and irresolvable  
16 Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate 
how a person should behave, and are not to be applied in 
making judgments of others.  
Relative to individual 
17 Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so 
complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate 
their own individual codes. 
Relative to individual 
18 Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain 
types of actions could stand in the way of better human 
relations and adjustment. 
Variable 
19 No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie 
is permissible or not permissible totally depends on the 
situation. 
Variable, relative to 
situation  
20 Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the action. 
Variable, relative to 
situation  
 
Most items combine at least two of the three criteria of individual relativism. When an 
individual scores high on all of these criteria, we can conclude that the participant 
explicitly endorses moral relativism as here defined. The items are biased towards 
extreme moral relativism: moderate moral relativists would agree that some moral 
standards are individualistic (item 11) or personal rules (item 16), but they would not 
necessarily agree with the more general wording that is used. Moreover, it is not clear if 
normative relativism is assessed. ‘Relativist’ answers are also concomitant with other 
interpretations, such as meta-ethical relativism (moral statements are relatively true or 
false) (see also Goodwin and Darley 2010). On the other hand, Forsyth (1992) explicitly 
avoids an a priori commitment to an objectivistic moral philosophy. All things 
considered, this is a useful starting point if we want to know about the possibility of lay 
people being folk moral relativists.  
 
Studies that make use of the EPQ frequently inform us about variation in moral views, as 
suggested by Flanagan (1991). Researchers often report that, among adults, age is 
negatively correlated with relativism (e.g., Chen and Liu 2009; Dubinsky et al. 2005; 
  
Hartikainen and Torstila 2004; Fernando et al. 2008; Vitell and Paolillo 2003). In most 
studies, religiosity is negatively correlated with relativism (Chen & Liu. 2009; Barnett et 
al. 1996; Vitell and Paolillo 2003 but see Fernando et al 2008). Relativism also differs 
significantly between nations (Forsyth et al. 2008; Alas et al. 2010), with the East 
generally being more relativistic than the West (Forsyth et al. 2008). We see here that a 
very general but less biased conception of relativism yields a more nuanced view on folk 
moral relativism. We suggest that more elaborate scales could differentiate between 
normative and meta-ethical relativism, between cultural and individual relativism, and 
between extreme and moderate relativism. 
 
Moral heuristics 
 
Experimental philosophers have recently begun to examine individuals’ implicit moral 
heuristics by presenting them with scenarios and varying the relevant conditions therein. 
However, these studies mostly tap into meta-ethical commitments: participants are asked 
to assess the truth value of moral statements (Sarkissian et al.3; Goodwin and Darley 
2008, 2010). While these studies offer preliminary indications that some individuals 
could be meta-ethical relativists, it would be useful to explicitly try to tap into normative 
implicit heuristics.  
 
A critique that might be raised is that researchers mostly study moral psychology by 
analyzing subjects’ explicit verbal reports of their reasoning while many moral 
psychologists now hold that moral behavior and moral judgment do not correlate with 
explicit reasoning (e.g., Haidt 2001; interestingly, Piaget [1932] was already aware of this 
difficulty). On the other hand, explicit verbal reasoning is used to convince others about 
one’s moral judgments and to influence others’ moral behavior (also Haidt 2001). This 
suggests that it is appropriate to approach the issue of folk morality from different angles: 
moral behavior, implicit moral judgments, and explicit moral reasoning.  
 
4.1.2 Development and transparency  
 
Many developmental studies are premised on the assumption that there is a 
moral/conventional distinction. These studies suggest that young children (ages 4-7) are 
non-relativists about morality (e.g., Nichols & Folds-Bennett 2003; Wainryb et al. 2004). 
However, some of the previously mentioned caveats are important, most notably that 
only a small number of typically moral items were tested (hitting, kicking, helping, and 
breaking another child’s toys). This raises the issue that a distinction should be made 
between extreme and moderate relativism. This distinction is even more important in 
light of Gabennesch’s critique on the development of the moral/conventional distinction. 
Gabennesch suggests that certain issues might be relativized more easily than others. He 
reviews previous studies and notes that both moral and conventional transgressions are 
non-relativistically wrong for young children, while fewer transgressions are 
relativistically wrong for older children. He also notes that some conventional 
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transgressions are more likely than others to continue to be reified at a later age. This, he 
argues, is caused by their lack of transparency, the extent to which their human origins 
are visible for the subject. A range of factors influence a rule’s transparency. For 
example, a rule with which the child is familiar will be more transparent than a new one; 
a rule that applies only to certain groups or only in certain contexts will be more 
transparent; and so on. In accordance with this, non-relativism was found to not be 
exclusive to moral issues (Nichols & Folds-Bennet 2003; Wainryb 2004). Given the 
previously stated critique (Section 4.1.1) that it should be up to the participant to 
explicitly classify rules as ‘moral’ or ‘conventional,’ there are not sufficient grounds to 
conclude that only conventional rules can become relative, while moral rules cannot. 
Kelly et al. (2007) provide findings consonant with the suggestion that moral rules can be 
thought of as relative. They find that participants are indeed more likely to say that more 
historically and locally variable moral rules against slavery or cannibalism are ok or not 
depending on time and place. However, as Kelly et al. did not ask participants to justify 
their responses, we cannot know for certain how their findings, including order effects, 
articulate with folk moral relativism. Also, Nichols (2004) found in one study that moral 
non-objectivism was positively correlated with years spent in college. Moral non-
objectivism being a function of education is consonant with the transparency hypothesis; 
nonetheless, more research is needed to establish a potential causal link between non-
objectivism, relativism, and education. Moreover, this finding did not replicate in 
additional studies (id.). In short, preliminary data suggest that factors that have to do with 
the rule in question can interact with age or education to make a rule relative, 
independent of the rule being moral or conventional. While other factors undoubtedly 
matter in reifying rules (Schweder 1990), Gabennesch’s critique is a promising one.   
4.2 Confidence 
 
Can empirical studies inform the philosophical discussion about moral confidence? More 
specifically, does moral relativism lead to a weakened adherence to moral principles? 
Research using Forsyth’s EPQ sheds light on the question of whether moral confidence is 
undergirded by moral non-relativism. More relativistic adult U.S. consumers are less 
likely to find a range of consumer practices wrong (Vitell & Paolillo 2003). Practices 
examined concerned illegal behavior such as changing price tags as a consumer on 
consumer products, lying about a child’s age in order to get a lower price, not telling the 
truth when negotiating about the price of a car, and illegally copying computer software. 
Among marketing managers, those who score high on relativism have been found to 
think that ethics is less important for a firm’s long term plans (Vitell et al. 2003). Chinese 
managers are reportedly more favorable towards bribery and kickbacks if they score 
higher on relativism (Tian 2008). In another study, relativists are shown to be more 
accepting of violating property rights (Winter et al. 2004). Business undergraduates at a 
U.S. university who score higher on relativism score lower on corporate social 
responsibility, the extent to which they take the wider social impact of their business into 
account instead of just caring about profits and stockholders (Kolodinsky et al. 2010). 
Nichols (2004) categorized adult participants as moral non-objectivists if they said that 
there was no fact of the matter regarding a moral disagreement; otherwise, they were 
classified as moral objectivists. He made use of the moral/conventional task and found 
  
that, in all four studies, non-objectivists found ‘moral’ transgressions less serious (but 
equally non-permissible) compared to objectivists, suggesting again a negative 
relationship between relativism and confidence. 
 
Being motivated to act in accordance with moral principles is another major aspect of 
moral confidence. As for behavior, Forsyth (1980) and Forsyth and Berger (1982) did not 
find a relationship between ethical position and cheating behavior on a test. On the other 
hand, Indonesian consumers scoring high on relativism report being more likely to 
engage in questionable but legal activities, and being more likely to initiate an illegal 
activity from which they would benefit (Lu and Lu 2010).  
 
In all of the studies discussed above, it is possible that moral confidence decreases 
relativism as well as the other way around. Fernando et al. (2008) find that Australian 
relativist managers score lower on the ‘corporate ethical values scale,’ which measures 
the employee’s perceived ethical values in his company, and the authors hypothesize that 
perceived corporate ethical values have a causal influence on relativism scores. Also, 
these studies do not make a distinction between different kinds of moral relativism. Here 
it would be particularly interesting to know if the correlation holds for all moral issues or 
only for a specific subset, and to investigate what happens when people come to take new 
values into account, as described by Wong (2006),.  
4.3. Tolerance and respect 
 
We mentioned philosophers who argue that tolerance - not interfering with behavior that 
one judges to be morally wrong - is psychologically unstable. The purported reason is 
that a moral judgment involves the desire to regulate others’ behavior. There are different 
gradations of intervention, and openly judging an act may in itself partially inhibit others 
from performing the given act. Also, even in the case where judgments are kept private, 
studies suggest that people prefer to distance themselves from others who hold diverging 
moral beliefs. Haidt et al. (2003) found that participants preferred roommates who held 
similar political and moral views. They were much more willing to have more moral 
variation in a classroom seminar, and slightly less at the university as a whole. Other 
kinds of diversity (e.g., demographic) were much more readily accepted in roommates. 
This was partly replicated by Wright et al. (2008), whose study we discussed in Section 
4.1.1. Participants were less accepting of someone as a potential roommate who differed 
in moral issues, than of encountering a morally disagreeing person in a seminar or at 
university as a whole. Participants were also less accepting of encountering someone who 
disagreed on moral issues than when encountering someone who differed on non-moral 
issues. They also found that participants would sit farther away from, and more turned 
away from, a discussion partner who disagreed on a moral issue than a discussion partner 
who disagreed on a conventional issue. Other subtle changes in behavior occur: 
participants in an experimental setting gave fewer raffle tickets to a student whom they 
thought disagreed with them on moral attitudes than they gave to a student who was said 
to disagree on non-moral attitudes (Wright et al. 2008). This indicates that, at the 
interpersonal level, the requirement of tolerance may run counter to subtle discriminatory 
  
mechanisms, such as shunning, that are not easily regulated because of their intimate 
nature. 
 
This suggests that tolerance is less of a problem between groups that do not intimately 
interact in the first place. Nonetheless, Lester & Roberts (2009) noticed that even when 
participants claimed to tolerate behavior that was symbolic of a worldview they did not 
agree with, people were less willing to defend the rights of groups with which they did 
not agree. However, after taking a course on the seven major world religions, students 
claimed to be more willing to defend the rights of suppressed groups and to allow 
individuals from all other worldviews to execute their rights. This effect was slight, but 
significant. It is hard to know whether participants’ self-reports reflect their actual 
behavior, but explicitly formulated judgments might have a general effect on one’s own 
and others’ behavior (see also Haidt 2001).  
 
The possibility of tolerance might depend on the principles in question, and the relativism 
or age of actors. In observations of naturally-occurring behavior among 7 to 14 year old 
children in Chicago, Nucci & Nucci (1982) find that moral transgressions elicited more 
retaliatory actions than did conventional transgressions; however, conventional 
transgressions elicited more ridicule than did moral transgressions, and there were no 
differences in threats and commands to stop the act between the two kinds of 
transgressions. There were no main age effects for retaliation, threat, ridicule or 
command. Smetana (1981) asked 2 to 9 year old children if perpetrators deserved 
punishment and how much (none, a little or a lot). She found that moral transgressions 
were deemed more punishable than conventional transgressions. Hollos et al. (1986) 
tested 8-18 year old Nigerians and found that these participants wanted an authority 
figure to react to moral transgression by flogging the transgressor. However, in line with 
the previously discussed age differences, 8-11 year old subjects thought that conventional 
transgressions should be punished by flogging, while 15-18 year old subjects gave this 
response significantly less. These findings suggest that both moral and conventional 
transgressions do elicit interference from children and adolescents, be it in the form of 
punishment, retaliation, ridicule, threats, or commands. However, since it is likely that 
moral transgressions are less tolerated than conventional transgressions, it is also likely 
that, mediated by age, relativized moral judgments will be more tolerated than universal 
or objective moral judgments. 
 
Similar age differences are evident in the realm of respect. Here we have to ask how 
people judge others with whom they morally disagree, as opposed to judging their moral 
opinions. In Section 4.1.1, we discussed the study of Wainryb et al (2004), conducted 
among 5 to 9 years old children. The moral issues used were breaking other children’s 
toys and kicking other children. The children used positive descriptors to describe the 
characters who expressed divergent beliefs bearing on taste, ambiguous facts, and facts, 
but they described as bad characters who expressed divergent moral beliefs. Regardless 
of the realm of disagreement, 7-9 year olds described disagreeing characters as nice or 
normal more often than did 5 year olds. Enright and Lapsley (1981) presented a short 
vignette to adults, students from grades 3 to 12, and college students, and asked for their 
judgment about a moral dilemma. They then confronted participants with an audio-taped 
  
peer stating the opposite judgment. Participants could then choose what they thought 
about the other person. Possible items were “The other does not seem to be a 
predominantly good person but there is some good in everyone” (level 1), “the other is 
probably as good a person as anyone else” (level 2) and “I cannot tell what kind of a 
person the other is until I know much more about the other’s beliefs” (level 3). The 
authors found that college students were most likely to agree with level 3-like items, 
denoting that one can judge others, but not based on only this one moral belief; adults 
(older than college students but matched on amount of education)  scored slightly lower 
than college students. This indicates that character judgments are initially linked to moral 
belief judgments, and that respect increases with age or education, regardless of the realm 
of disagreement. This is also analogous to the finding that education is positively related 
to relativism (see Section 4.1.2). Again, we conclude that factors that have to do with the 
rule in question could make diversity more or less difficult to respect, highlighting the 
need for moderate accounts of tolerance and respect.  
5 Summary and conclusions 
 
Naturalist philosophers welcome empirical evidence to constrain or support theories of 
normative relativism. An important critique against all versions of normative relativism 
holds that individuals think of morality as non-relative, therefore it is not feasible to 
impose normative relativism as a requirement. At first sight, results from moral 
psychology inspired by Kohlberg and findings from domain theory, indeed suggest that 
morality is inherently non-relative: children and adults are non-relativists about moral 
rules, and they only relativize rules that are not in the moral domain. However, a deeper 
look suggests that skepticism is in order, as much of moral psychology defines morality 
as non-relative, either implicitly or explicitly. Subsequently, no measures are taken to 
independently decide whether or not participants’ moral reasoning is at work. As such, no 
relative rule will ever be described under the headings of moral psychology. While it 
might well be the case that people are moral non-relativists, the methods employed in 
most of this research are biased against finding moral relativist leanings.  
 
Other traditions, for example research making use of the Ethics Position Questionnaire, 
do find diversity in moral views. Moral relativism is less abundant in the West and 
among religious people, and it declines with age among adults. Promising possibilities of 
folk moral relativism can also be found in moral development research and studies that 
are critical of mainstream interpretations of the moral/conventional distinction. Older 
children treat a wider range of rules as relative than do younger children. Assuming that 
some of these rules might be categorized as moral by the children themselves, children 
might become more relativistic in the course of moral development. The relativity of 
moral rules might also depend on the specific properties of the rule, most notably the 
degree to which their human origins are transparent. In all of this, we have to keep in 
mind that it is unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists. Therefore, it is important 
to test participants on a range of issues. Here, the lack of an encompassing theory of folk 
moral relativism makes it difficult to predict what moral rules are likely to be relativized 
and who will be what kind of moral relativist.  
 
  
The second worry is that we need the idea that morality is objective in order to have 
confidence in our moral values. Some results are in accordance with moral relativism 
being negatively correlated with moral confidence as measured by perceived seriousness 
of moral transgressions and judging moral behavior. However, researchers have yet to 
explore the relationship between moral relativism and actual behavior. Moreover, these 
studies do not inform us much regarding the direction of causality, which could go either 
way – as such, philosophers’ intuitions that relativism correlates with decreased 
confidence might reflect an existing correlation, but with the causal arrows going from 
confidence to relativism instead of the other way around. More research on this topic is 
clearly necessary. 
 
A third constraint is linked to the requirement of tolerance: judging an action to be wrong 
purportedly implies that we are motivated to stop the action. The paradoxical nature of 
tolerance led philosophers to develop notions of respect and ambivalence. Studies do find 
a link between moral (and conventional) disagreement and interference; this speaks 
against tolerance as a feasible strategy towards much of moral diversity. However, 
findings to date also suggest that distance, operationalized as amount of intimate 
interaction, can be a mediating factor, suggesting the need to distinguish between cultural 
and individual moral diversity. Moreover, we find the same moderating factors for 
tolerance and respect as for moral relativism – age and education seem to impact one’s 
capacity to tolerate and respect certain other ways of life. The possibility remains that 
moderate tolerance and respect are psychologically feasible.  
 
We therefore arrive at the following circumspect conclusions. Major traditions in the 
empirical literature seem to support the view that morality is intuitively thought of as 
objective. However, a deeper reading indicates that caution is in order here. It is indeed 
unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists, meaning that no moral rules are 
thought of as objective or universal. However, this should not be taken as implying that 
moral rules are intrinsically non-relative: there are both individual differences and 
properties of the rules themselves that influence whether or not a rule is thought of as 
relative. Results indicate that, in the course of moral development, individuals might 
become more relativist, tolerant, and respectful. More transparent rules might be more 
likely to become relativized. Moreover, results are consistent with tolerance and respect 
being mediated by distance to others. In sum, it is likely that many people are, or can be, 
moderate moral relativists.  
 
All in all, this is a relatively underexplored field, both in empirical work and in 
philosophical theories. We argue that empiricists can learn from philosophers when 
investigating folk moral relativism. Future research would provide a clearer portrait of 
the nature and extent of folk moral relativism were investigators to adopt some rules of 
thumb. First, participants should always be asked to categorize events as moral or non-
moral instead of leaving this categorization solely to the researchers. Second, a 
distinction should be made between the extremes of individual and cultural relativism. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that adults are more likely to tolerate cultural than 
individual diversity. Since this is an important philosophical and social distinction, it is 
one of the mediating factors that deserve empirical attention. Third, we would urge 
  
researchers to investigate the development of relativism for ‘transparent’ moral issues, 
such as gender discrimination, hierarchy, inequality, or modes of punishment. One should 
take into account that relativism most likely does not mean extreme relativism. Finally, 
investigators should probe implicit heuristics as well as explicit reasoning and behavior. 
Behavior is of primary importance for discussions surrounding confidence and tolerance. 
Lastly, studies in which participants are asked to evaluate the person as well as the 
behavior are particularly informative for the notion of respect.  
 
In contrast to the diversity of philosophical perspectives being developed on these issues, 
most empirical researchers have been, and continue to be, deeply influenced by modern 
Western moral philosophies; as such they conceptualize morality as objective. Due to its 
influence on methodological design, this perspective then biases empirical findings 
accordingly. Similarly, most empirical research that addresses relativism, objectivity, or 
universalism does so in broad categorical fashion, ignoring philosophers’ distinctions 
between different kinds of moral relativism, and this despite the fact that at least some of 
the empirical findings to date indicate that such distinctions should be taken seriously. It 
is time that, on the one hand, more philosophers recognize the empirical nature of much 
of the discussion surrounding relativism, and, on the other hand, moral psychologists 
question their conceptual assumptions.  Awareness of both existing findings and lacunae 
therein should invite philosophers to become more familiar with the empirical literature 
at hand; it should also invite more empiricists to directly address the question of folk 
moral relativism without presupposing it.  
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